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REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS:
PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

James R. Kavanaugh*
The State's Attorney possesses broad discretionary authority to
prosecute all violations of Illinois law. In this Article, Mr.
Kavanaugh analyzes the sources and application of this authority
with specific emphasis on the States Attorney's role in the charging
process, grand jury proceedings, plea bargaining and sentencing.
The author also suggests certain legal and ethical limitations on the
use of these powers to ensure that the prosecutor maintains the
proper balance between the roles of advocate and seeker ofjustice.
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as illusive and impossible
to define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to
be told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair
play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the
abuse of power, and the citizens' safety lies in the prosecutor who
tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility.' -Robert H. Jackson, Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court.

Organized society has developed a system of laws restraining individual activity and providing for a resultant penalty when these laws
are violated. In Illinois, the State's Attorney is empowered 2 to com-

mence and prosecute a violation of these laws, be it felony or misdemeanor, 3 on behalf of the People. 4 The exercise of the State's Attorney's power has limitations and guidelines provided by statute,
case law and professional ethics. This Article will analyze the powers
of the Illinois prosecutor and the sources of those powers, emphasizing those specific areas where the prosecutorial power is most frequently applied. In addition, this Article will analyze the legal and
ethical limitations on the use of these powers.
* Chief of the Criminal Bureau, Cook County State's Attorney's Office; B.S., University of
Detroit; J.D., John Marshall Law School. This Article is dedicated to those prosecutors, present
and past, who have shared with me, either directly or through the conduit of generations of
prosecutors, their brotherhood, experience, knowledge, professionalism and ethical fibre-my
thanks.
1. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 3, 6 (1940).
2. People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 I11.231, 59 N.E.2d 96 (1945); People v. Munson, 319 I11. 596, 150 N.E. 280 (1925); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5 (Supp. 1976).
3. Id.
4. People v. Rhodes, 38 I11.2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400 (1967).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:625

THE POWER To PROSECUTE

The office of State's Attorney is constitutionally created, 5 and endowed with broad executive powers that cannot be encroached upon
by either the legislature or the judiciary. 6 Those powers are considered to be vested not only in the personage of the elected State's
7
Attorney but also in each of his duly appointed Assistants.
Because the office of State's Attorney is of constitutional creation,
its functions are thus subject to both the proscriptions and the protections which inure to governmental officers under the constitutional
doctrine of the separation of powers. 8 In juxtaposition to the other
governmental branches' inability to encroach on the executive power
of the prosecutor is their corollary ability, inherent in the tri-partite
form of Illinois government, to exercise Constitutional checks and
balances on the executive function of the prosecutor. 9
An analysis of the judicial interpretations of prosecutorial powers is
crucial because of the inherent importance of any constitutionally
created office and because the Illinois Constitution itself gives almost
no guidance to the breadth of such power. The 1970 Illinois Constitution, like the 1870 Constitution, simply provides for the office's existence, the manner of filling the prosecutor's position, the year of election, the term of office, and the requirements for eligibility to the
office. The only aspect of the office to "be provided for by law" was
the salary of the office holder. 10
The source of the State's Attorney's power is puzzling in that
the 1970 Constitution places the provision authorizing the existence of the office under the Judicial Article, even though the courts
have said that the State's Attorney, while exercising some "quasi-judicial powers,"" is a member of the executive branch of government.12
App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759 (1964).
5. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 19; People v. Pohl, 47 I11.
79, 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953); People v. Brown,
6. People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 I11.
130 I11.
App.2d 588, 264 N.E.2d 423 (1970).
App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759 (1964); People ex rel. Landers v.
7. People v. Pohl, 47 I11.
142, 107 N.E. 879 (1915); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 53 § 18
Toledo, St. Louis & W.R.R. Co., 267 I11.
(1975); see generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1961); 27 C.J.S. Dist. and Pros. Attys. § 30(1)
(1959).
8. People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 59 N.E.2d 96 (1945); People v. Pohl,
47 II1. App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759 (1964); ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
9. See People ex rel. Hanrahan v. One 1965 Oldsmobile, 52 1ll.2d 37, 284 N.E.2d 646,
App.3d 534, 337
rev'd per curiam, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); See generally People v. Boclaire, 33 Ill.
N.E.2d 728 (1975); City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 Ill.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146
(1974).
10. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 19.
315, 120 N.E. 244 (1918).
11. People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 I11.
12. People v. Struger, 22 Ill. App.3d 371, 317 N.E.2d 340 (1974); People v. Brown, 130 I11.
App.2d 588, 264 N.E.2d 423 (1970).
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Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has designated the State's Attorney as a "county officer."1 3 Section Four of the 1970 Illinois Constitution 1 4 speaks specifically of "county officers," but does not name the
office of State's Attorney as one of them. A subsection of Article VII,
Section Four, however, does state that "County officers shall have
those duties, powers and functions provided by law and those provided by county ordinance," in addition to those "derived from coinmon law or historical precedent unless altered by law or county
ordinance."1 5 A reading of this subsection, along with two other provisions may clarify the nature of the State's Attorney's office.
Article II, Section 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution states
that: "the enumeration in this Constitution of specified powers
and functions shall not be construed as a limitation of powers of
state government."16 Section 9 of the Transition Schedule
states that "the rights and duties of all public bodies shall remain as if this Constitution has not been adopted with the exception of such changes as are contained in this Constitution." 17
The Commentators to the Smith-Hurd Illinois Constitution noted that
the 1970 revisions "[did] not change the common law or statutory
duties of the State's Attorneys."1 8 An analytical reading of the above
three sections demonstrates that this conclusion is indeed correct.
The Illinois State's Attorney is, thus, a constitutional officer 1 9 exercising the common law powers of the prosecutor. 20 Through legislative authority, he is endowed with discretionary powers in the execution of the law 2 ' on behalf of the People. 22 In addition, the State
Attorney's office is vested with some portion of the sovereign power
23
of the State.
13. Ashton v. Cook County, 384 I11.
287, 51 N.E.2d 161 (1943), accord, People v. Pohl, 47
Ill. App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759 (1964).
14. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 4. But see People v. Williams, 232 Ill. 519, 83 N.E. 1047 (1908).
15.
16.
17.
18.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.

CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.

art. 7, § 4(d).
art. 2, § 2.
Transition Schedule, § 9.
art. 6, § 19, (Smith-Hurd) constitutional commentary at 532.

19. Boghosian v. Mid-City Nat'l Bank, 25 II. App.2d 455, 167 N.E.2d 442 (1960). See note
8 supra.

20. People v. Pohl, 47 Ill.
App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759 (1964); Wilson v. County of Marshall, 257 11. App. 220 (1930). See also notes 2 & 18 supra.

21. People v. Struger, 22 II. App.3d 371, 317 N.E.2d 340 (1974); People ex rel.Hanrahan
v. One 1965 Oldsmobile, 52 Ill.2d 37, 284 N.E.2d 646 (1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5

(1975).
22. People v. McCollough, 57 Ill.2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462 (1974); People v. Rhodes, 38
Ill.2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400 (1967).
23. People ex rel. Landers v. Toledo, St. Louis & W. R.R. Co., 267 Ill. 142, 107 N.E. 879
(1915).
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Having looked broadly at the sources of the State's Attorney's powers, it is now appropriate to delve into specific exercises of those
powers in some "high-visibility" areas. Juxtaposed to this analysis will
be an examination of the legal and ethical limitations on the use of
24
such powers.
DISCRETION IN CHARGING

One aspect of that power -discretion in charging-is the gravamen of these comments. The power of the State's Attorney to commence and prosecute all criminal actions is set forth by Illinois statute. 25 The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that
power. 26 The Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that the State's
Attorney is indeed empowered with the discretion to determine what
offenses can and should be charged. The court has stressed that:
The State's Attorney is the representative of the People and has
the responsibility of evaluating the evidence and other pertinent
factors and determining what offense can properly and should
properly be charged. The kind of determination committed to the
discretion of the State's Attorney by the statute . . . is not, in our
27
opinion, an unconstitutional delegation of authority.

This discretion has been recognized as exclusive in nature, beyond
interference even by the courts. The courts do not have the authority
to: 1) foreclose the filing of a complaint by the prosecutor; 2 8 2) prevent the re-filing of a case unless double jeopardy has attached; 29
3) refuse to allow the filing or dismissal of an indictment based on a
24. Space limitations obviously preclude analysis of all specific uses of prosecutional power
and the restrictions placed on those powers by law and ethics. The areas of analysis chosen were
those areas which had in combination the attributes of common use, common abuse, reader
interest, and author's interest-not necessarily in that order. A pithy caveat is here set forth as
a good embarkation point for the analysis which follows.
Among his other endeavors, the public prosecutor strives to maintain an upright
stance in the stained halls of criminal justice. He correctly senses that the people
demand more of him than diligent, workmanlike performance of his public chores.
Virtue is the cherished ingredient in his role: the honorable exercise of the considerable discretionary power with which our legal system has endowed his office.
Daily, the ethical fibre of the prosecutor is tested -and through him, in large measure, the rectitude of the system of justice.
Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71
MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1145 (1973).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5 (1975).

26. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S.311 (1884). It is interesting to see the Court's recognition of
the prosecutor-witness privileged communication doctrine in this case.
27. People v. Graham, 25 Ill. App.3d 853, 323 N.E.2d 441 (1975); People v. McCollough,
57 I11.2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462 (1974).
28. People v. Piatt, 35 Ill.2d 72, 219 N.E.2d 481 (1966).
29. People v. McGraw, 77 II1. App.2d 41, 222 N.E.2d 130 (1966).
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previous finding of no probable cause in the case; 30 or 4) foreclose
31
the change in election of the charges prior to jeopardy attaching.
Furthermore, a court cannot dismiss charges for alleged "delay" when
the statutory speedy trial provision has not been violated, 3 2 and cannot dismiss a properly stated charge because it believes that another
33
is more appropriate.
In rejecting an attempt by a trial court to amend or reduce the
prosecutor's charge, an Illinois reviewing court noted the broad discretion of the executive office and warned that the judiciary may not
substitute its own discretionary power for that of the State's Attorney. 34 The court held that "the State's Attorney's Office is a part of
the executive branch. It is clear that the judicial department may not
35
take as its own discretionary powers vested in an executive officer."
Prosecutors groping through dusty tomes for the case "on all
fours," with some obscure legal point, who perhaps have mumbled
intonations of an unkind nature about the ineptness of reviewing
courts, should be quick to discern the wisdom of the court's decision
not to encroach upon the prosecutorial charging discretion. The
judiciary has wisely chosen not to share in the awesome weight of
responsibility for exercising the charging power. For the benefit of
the unexperienced in the field of prosecution, some fleshing out of
that proposition is in order. It is not until theory becomes practice
that the rub of having the powerful discretion in charging becomes
apparent. You, the reader, for the purpose of effect, should imagine
yourself to be the State's Attorney who is still lighting his pipe with
campaign matches bearing his name and various crime fighter and
justice slogans. Your first few days in office might bring you the following charging decisions:
Monday: The national representative of a rape crisis group and
thirty followers are at your office door with a rape victim. They
demand prosecution of a defendant the police have in custody. The
16 year old white victim says that she was raped at gun point two
months ago but was so embarassed and frightened that she didn't
30. People v. Kent, 54 Ill.2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710 (1972).
31. People v. Hoover 12 I11.App.3d 25, 297 N.E.2d 400 (1973); People v. Guido, 11 I11.
App.3d 1067, 297 N.E.2d 18 (1973); People v. Jackson, 132 Ill. App.2d 1059, 271 N.E.2d 673
(1971); People v. Seipel, 108 I11. App.2d 334, 247 N.E.2d 905 (1969).
32. People v. Green, 8 I11.App.3d 737, 290 N.E.2d 12 (1972); People v. Barksdale, 110 Ill.
App.2d 163, 249 N.E.2d 165 (1969).
33. People v. Long, 126 I11.App.2d 103, 261 N.E.2d 437 (1970).
34. People v. Rotrainel, 5 Ill. App.3d 196, 282 N.E.2d 484 (1972).
35. People v. Rotramel, 5 111.App.3d 196, 199, 282 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1972). See generally,
63 AM. JuOt. 2d Pros. Attys. § 25 (1972); 27 C.J.S. Dist. and Pros. Attys. § 14 (1) (1959); Annot.,
82 A.L.R.2d 774 § 4 (1962).

630

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:625

tell anyone. Today she saw the offender on the street and called
the local rape crisis group who convinced the police to make the
arrest. The alleged rape victim has never seen the black defendant
before the rape but is absolutely positive about the identification.
There is no other evidence.
Tuesday: The vice reporter for the local newspaper is on the
phone. He is calling from the church hall, which the police have
raided pursuant to a newsman's tip and found 200 church members, the pastor and a curate all unmistakably engaged in gambling
at a "Las Vegas" fund raiser night for the sick of the parish. The
reporter hands the phone to the police chief who needs advice.
Wednesday: A ten-year veteran policeman with an exemplary
record who had never fired his gun in the line of duty shot and
killed a suspect fleeing from an arrest for a felony. The suspect had
broken into a garage to retrieve a bike he sold to the garage owner
for which full payment had not been made. The suspect orally
confessed in front of several witnesses before he ran. The officer
yelled "halt" and fired a warning shot. The suspect, a 15 year old
whose hands were cuffed behind his back, was shot in the back as
a result of the second shot. The homicide commander calls for advice.
Thursday: A nine year old is found partially dismembered in a
smoking garbage can. The next day, following an anonymous tip,
the police arrested and questioned a suspect, on parole for child
murder. He is found to have human but untypeable blood spots on
his shoes. Before his lawyer arrives the defendant has given a full
written confession which, as the lawyer accurately points out, lacks
a crucial "Miranda" warning. There is no oral confession. A 10 year
old boy had seen the suspect near the garbage can on the night of
the crime. You have no other evidence. The Chief of Police has
just announced to the wire services that his men have cracked the
36
murder and that the suspect has confessed.
In exercising his discretion in charging, the prosecutor is routinely
subjected to pressures from all sides. He is wise to consider the expectations and demands of the victims, witnesses, police, press, public, judiciary, defense counsel, and defendants. Additional factors he
is faced with include the overloaded court docket, the nature of the
crime, the defendant's background, the difficulty and probability of
conviction, and the availability of prosecutorial resources. While it
certainly can be argued that some of these factors should play no role
in the exercise of the charging discretion, it cannot be disputed that
such pressures exist.
Recognizing the potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion, a
number of commentators have suggested means of providing a check
36. Each case has the injected element of obvious media interest and coverage. The element of pressure for decision from the "fourth estate" exists here to eliminate any "Pontius
Pilate handwashing." Benign abandonment of the charging decision to the police is unavailable
in the exercise.

PROSECUTORIAL POWERS
upon such abuse. One proposal has been to develop and publish
specific prosecutorial standards, thereby permitting judicial review of
both the standards and prosecutors' adherance to them. 3 7 Another
proposal is that the court require statistical data concerning the
law in question in order to determine whether it has been selectively
enforced. If selective enforcement were demonstrated, the court
could then make an in camera inspection of the prosecutor's file
and subject the prosecutor to testimonial examination. 3
These commentators, however, have directed their attention almost
exclusively to prosecutorial discretion exercised in the federal system.
However, major differences exist between the offices of District Attorney and States Attorney. In the federal system, the prosecutor is
often under relatively little compulsion to prosecute because of the
nature of the crime. The bulk of the federal criminal law consists of
crimes which are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Most of
these crimes are covert and have no definable victim. Also, the prosecutorial branch of the federal government largely controls the direction of its enforcement personnel's investigative activities.
The state prosecutor, on the other hand, deals with all of the common law crimes. Because he is elected rather than appointed, the
state prosecutor is under relatively great pressure to prosecute those
crimes which generate strong public indignation. The police who
bring the robbed, raped, burgled, and murdered victims to his prosecutorial doorstep are independent of his direction. Although his discretion theoretically allows him the power to reject prosecution and
to say to the victim, the police and the public, "Sorry, we have a big
push on this year for kidnappers only," doing so is certainly not feasi-.
ble. The state prosecutor is typically presented with victim, witnesses, and police, and must, without unnecessary delay, 3 9 answer
the basic charging questions of whether, what, and who to charge.
In answering these questions, the state prosecutor currently can
expect very little practical guidance from the courts. There is a
wealth of decisions concerned with the mechanical and procedural
defects in charging, 40 some general admonitions, 4 1 and a few cases
37. Note, Reviewability of Prosecutional Discretion: Failure to Prosecute 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 130 (1975). The primary emphasis relates to review of prosecutorial discretion exercised by
federal agencies. It does, however, make valuable comparisons to the criminal prosecutorial use
of discretion.
38. Comment, Defense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory Prosecution, 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 648.
39. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1975).
40. See ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 103-5, 111-1, 114-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
41. See cases cited at notes 3-10 and accompanying text supra. See also Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448 (1962). The case concerns mandatory sentencing of persons to a life term after a fourth
conviction. The Court denied the prisoner's equal protection-due process arguments.
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dealing with discriminatory enforcement.4 2 However, the courts
clearly, and appropriately, have declined to formulate definite standards for the exercise of the charging discretion.
The practical value of such guidelines as the American Bar Association Standards, 43 the National Prosecution Standards 44 and the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility 4 5 is also strictly limited.
Perhaps what these standards do accomplish is the condemnation of
prosecutorial discretion not motivated toward the public purpose of
the office. Ideally, a prosecutor would charge all those who will later
be found guilty of criminal conduct and never charge those who
would later be found not guilty. But doing so is clearly unrealistic. All
of the guidelines implicitly recognize the impossibility of prosecuting
all criminals, and explicitly reject any obligation to refrain from prosecuting an individual who might possibly be found innocent at a trial.
The appropriate balance is difficult to achieve.
The A.B.A. Standards 46 suggest that the charging discretion may
42. "It is the State's Attorney's duty to see that justice is done not only to the public at
large but to the accused as well. ' People v. Pohl, 47 I11.
App.2d at 242, 197 N.E.2d at 765. In
commenting on discrimination in the charging decision, a California court stated:
Appellant now in effect argues from this that equal protection should also be extended to any person to enable him to commit a crime on a basis of equality with
all other persons. While all persons accused of a crime are to be treated on a basis
of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the
commission of a crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a
defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for equal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society.
People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App.2d 1, 14, 117 P.2d 437, 446 (1941). See also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Comment, The Right to Non-DiscrininatoryLaw Enforcement of
State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961).
In Illinois, the court in People v. Fort, 133 Ill. App.2d 473, 273 N.E.2d 439 (1971), held Yick
Wo inapplicable where the defendant charged selective enforcement of non-discriminatory penal
law by failure to charge the other combatant with a battery charge. The court dismissed the
defendant's argument by stating: "There is no constitutional right to violate a penal law which is
non-discriminatory on its face." Id. at 484, 273 N.E.2d at 447. But see Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 244 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also People v. Jackson, 1 I11.
App.3d 109, 273 N.E.2d 535 (1975). See generally Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L. REV. 1030 (1967).
43. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL AMERICAN JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTOR'S FUNCTION (1974) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION].
44. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
45. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970) (hereinafter cited as ISBA
STANDARDS].
46. ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION. Standard 3.9 provides:
(A) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or cause to be instituted
criminal charges when he knows that the charges are not supported by probable
cause.
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be affirmatively used when there is reasonable support in evidence
for the charge and when there is probable cause. It further suggests
that the prosecutor give no weight to personal or political advantage
or disadvantage or a desire for a high record of convictions. However,
the prosecutor may charge even though he has a reasonable doubt.
The standards also suggest that a prosecutor may decline to prosecute,
even though the evidence would support a conviction, whenever it is
consistent with the public interest. The Illinois Code 4 7 provides that
the prosecutor may charge where probable cause exists. The National
Prosecution Standards 4 8 suggest that the decision to prosecute should
(B) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence may
exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his discretion are:
(I)
The prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty;
(II) The extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(III) The disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the
particular offense or the offender;
(IV) Possible improper motives of a complainant;
(V) Reluctance of the victim to testify;
(VI) Cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of
others;
(VII) Availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
(C) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to
the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to
a desire to enhance his record of convictions.
(D) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the prosecutor
should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in his jurisdiction juries
have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.
(E) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree
than he can support with evidence at trial.
47. ISBA STANDARD, D.R. 7-103(A). This section provides:
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to
be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are
not supported by probable cause.
48. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standards 9.0-9.4 These Standards provide:
Standard: 9.1
Authority to Charge.
The process of determining and initiating criminal charges is the responsibility of
the prosecutor. Within his discretion the prosecutor shall determine what charges
should be filed, how many charges should be filed, and how charges should be
presented.
Standard: 9.2
Responsibility of Charging.
The prosecutor has the responsibility to see that the charge selected adequately
describes the offense or offenses committed and provides for an adequate sentence for the offense or offenses.
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be made in the best interests of justice, listing fifteen factors which
may be considered in making the decision. The author suggests that
as nobly stated as these forays into the proper use of prosecutorial
discretion are, they are of no great help in reaching the answers to
the three charging questions which must be answered in a particular
case.
A common element in the A.B.A., National, and Illinois standards,
the goal of never charging an innocent person, is ethically satisfied if
the prosecutor has available a quantum of evidence equalling "probable cause." 4 9 No ,maximum quantum of proof or evidence is
stated. 50 The problem with these nebulous standards is that they
require an insufficient quantum of proof before charging, in that evidence sufficient to demonstrate probable cause is not adequate to defeat
a defendant's motion for directed verdict. Instead, a standard for charging which requires at least enough evidence to avoid a directed verdict
should be followed. The following standard is suggested as a criterion

Standard: 9.3
Considerations of Charging.
The prosecutor is not obligated to file all possible charges which available evidence might support. The prosecutor may properly exercise his discretion to present only those charges which he considers to be consistent with the best interests of justice. Among the factors which the prosecutor may consider in making
this decision are:
1. The nature of the offense;
2. The characteristics of the offender;
3. The age of the offense;
4. The interests of the victim;
5. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness;
6. A history of non-enforcement of a statute;
7. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice authority;
8. Aid to other prosecuting goals through non-prosecution;
9. Possible deterent value of prosecution;
10. Undue hardship caused to the accused;
11. Excessive cost of prosecution in relation to the seriousness of the offense;
12. The probability of conviction;
13. Recommendations of the involved law enforcement agency; and
14. Any mitigating circumstances.
Standard: 9.4
Restrictions
A. The prosecutor shall file only those charges which he believes can reasonably
be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.
B. The prosecutor shall not attempt to utilize the charging decision only as a
leverage device in obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges.
49. See notes 46-48 supra.
50. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978), the Court stated, "In our system,
so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused commited an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charges to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely within his discretion."
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suggested as a criterion for guiding the prosecutor in the exercise of
the charging discretion: charge those defendants with those crimes for

which there exists sufficient evidence to prove every element of the
crime charged, unless there is a substantial doubt that evidence
needed to prove the elements of a prima facie case will either not be
admitted or not be believed.
THE GRAND JURY: THE PROSECUTOR'S

ROLE

The grand jury is an entity in the criminal justice system that was
developed in England 51 and eventually incorporated into our criminal
justice system under the Constitution of the United States. 52 The
federal constitutional requirement that serious crimes be charged only
through use of the grand jury has been held not to apply to state
prosecutions. 5 3 Recent surveys indicate that twenty-four states still
require grand jury indictment, a procedure whereby the decision to
prosecute is based upon a grand jury's determination of probable
cause. However, twenty states offer the option of charging by information, a procedure whereby the decision to prosecute is made not
by a grand jury but by the prosecutor acting alone. 5 4 Article I, Section 7 of the Illinois Constitution provides for the mandatory use of
grand jury indictment unless the General Assembly abolishes or
limits its use. No person can be "held to answer" for serious crimes
unless that individual was initially charged by the grand jury or probable cause had been found at a preliminary hearing.
The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of this provision permits the grand jury to overrule a finding by the preliminary hearing
court that no "probable cause" exists. This grand jury process is
sought at the prosecutor's discretion.
In our opinion the language of the constitutional provision, as well
as. the history of its evolution, negates any thought that its purpose
was to attach finality to a finding of no probable cause, or to estab-

51. Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 119 (1964).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
54. Calkins, The Abolition of the GrandJury in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 423; NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 14.4 commentary. Standard 14.4 provides:
A. Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as legal advisor to the grand jury the
prosecutor may appropriately explain the law and express his opinion on the legal
significance of the evidence but he should give due deference to its status as an
independent legal body.
B. The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial before a
petit jury.
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lish mutually exclusive procedures so that grand jury proceedings
would be barred if an accused had been discharged upon preliminary hearing. . . . We know of no Illinois authority, however,
which holds that an order releasing an accused for want of probaor that it is in any way conclusive upon the
ble cause is appealable,
55
prosecution.
The prosecutor appears to have the further option of seeking an indictment without first going through the preliminary hearing process,

even though the defendant has already been charged by complaint for
examination. 5 6 The prosecutor must, however, take
preliminary
"prompt" 57 action to exercise the option of choosing between a preliminary hearing or a grand jury probable cause determination. In
People v. Howell,5 8 the Illinois Supreme Court expressed deep concern over the People's failure to afford defendants a prompt probable
cause determination.
Similarly, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 5 9 the United States Supreme Court
scrutinized a Florida prosecutor's use of discretion in filing an information and holding an accused for trial with neither preliminary
hearing rights nor grand jury action. Gerstein again recognized the
legal principle that a grand jury's indictment conclusively determines
the existence of probable cause and acts as a substitute for the magistrate's judgment in a preliminary hearing. 60 If the defendant has already been charged, the Illinois prosecutor who desires to have the
grand jury make the probable cause determination should seek this
determination "promptly."61
Recent statutory enactments have greatly reduced the use of grand
jury proceedings in Illinois. On October 1, 1975, amendments to the
Criminal Code of Procedure 62 eliminated the need for grand jury
indictment where a preliminary hearing has been held in accordance
64
with the law 63 and has found probable cause of at least one offense
arising from the transaction or the conduct of the defendant. This statutory change became popularly known as the "by-pass" statute since its
55. People v. Kent, 54 Ill.2d 161, 163-64, 295 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1972).
56. People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill.2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724 (1973).
57. People v. Howell, 60 Ill.2d 117, 119, 324 N.E.2d 403, 404 (1975).
58. Id. at 122, 324 N.E.2d at 406.
59. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974). Gerstein did not require an adversarial hearing
for the probable cause to detain procedures. It distinguished between a Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1969), full preliminary hearing and a Gerstein detention hearing.
60. Id. at 117 n.19.
61. Cook County prosecutors have opted not to use grand jury indictments after the defendant has been charged unless there is a true bill returned before the first date set for preliminary
hearing or unless the defendant contributes to or causes the. delay of the preliminary hearing.
62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,

1111-2 (1975).

63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3 (1975).
64. People v. Redmond, 67 Ill.2d 242, 367 N.E.2d 703 (1977).
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use "by-passes" the need for grand jury action. 65 This legislation has
greatly reduced the role of the grand jury as a "charging body." As a
result, greater time is now available for its investigatory and reporting
66
functions.
Judicial interpretation affords the prosecutor broad discretion in the
use of the grand jury's power of inquiry into violations of the criminal
law. Particularly important is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra67 in which the Court held
65. Kavanaugh & Jesser, The Grand Jury Bypass, 57 CHI. B. REC. 282 (1976).
66. Id. In that same legislative session the duties of the grand jury were changed to add
provisions that gave statutory direction to the State's Attorney to inform the grand jury of its
right to subpoena persons against whom a bill of indictment is being sought. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1124(b) (1975). The second paragraph of that new enactment provides for the "right to
counsel" for those persons already charged or against whom an indictment is being sought. It
provides further for admonitions to such a person not dissimilar from those required for defendants in custodial interrogation. Id.
For non-charged persons it would appear that this later legislative directive overreaches the
constitutional requirements found in United States v. Mondujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). The
argument can be made, however, that since the Illinois Constitution allows the legislature to
abolish or limit the use of the grand jury, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 7, then it follows that
restrictions of this nature are within the purview of the legislative function.
67. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Supreme Court noted that:
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in
secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may
compel the production of evidence, the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural
and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. It is a grand inquest,
a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is
not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable
result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be
found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974), quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 282 (1919).
In reference to the investigatory powers of the grand jury, the United States Supreme Court
was rather expansive in describing the breadth of the power: "[T]he investigation of crime by
the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person
and property of the citizen .... Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1971).
The Branzburg Court further stated that:
The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law enforcement
necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to determining whether a
crime has been committed and who committed it. . 'When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area . . .society's interest
is best served by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until every
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way
to find if a crime has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140
(2nd Cir. 1970). Such an investigation may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence
proferred by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of'the grand jurors .... It
is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination of
whether the proceedings will result in an indictment can be made ....
Id. at 701-02.
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that a grand jury witness cannot invoke the exclusionary rule. Granting such a privilege, the. Court stated, would cause undue interference with the effective discharge of the grand jury's duties." 8
Likewise, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule which prevents the admission at trial of any evidence derived from illegal
searches or seizures is inapplicable to grand jury proceedings and
does not bar the prosecutor from asking questions based on informa69
tion derived from the alleged breach of Fourth Amendment rights.
Illinois reviewing courts have also dealt with the scope of
prosecutorial use of the grand jury. For example, the courts have
determined that subpoenas issued by the grand jury which are unrestricted in the scope of production may be reviewed by the trial court
and either quashed or limited. 70 Furthermore, the prosecutor need
not establish "probable cause" in order to have the grand jury subpoena witnesses to testify. 7 1 The prosecutor, through use of the
grand jury, can compel voice or handwriting exemplars without infringing on Fourth, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights or the
rights guaranteed under the correlative provisions of the Illinois Constitution. 72 The prosecutor's use of the grand jury to inquire into offenses does not create the right to conduct an investigation into the
personal affairs of citizens where there is no charge or offense involved. 73 However, he can compel witnesses to testify before a'grand
jury subject to the contempt power of the court. These powers may
be exercised even when the answer would be self-accusatory, as long
74
as immunity is granted after application pursuant to statute.
As with the exercise of charging discretion, the prosecutor shoulders the responsibility for the exercise of the grand jury discre-

68. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
69. Id. at 349.
70. People v. Lurie, 39 Ill.2d 331, 235 N.E.2d 637 (1968).
71. People v. Adam, 51 Il.2d 46, 280 N.E.2d 205 (1972).
72. People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power, 54 Il.2d 154, 295 N.E.2d 472 (1973); cf. United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (upheld power of federal grand jury to compel a witness to
make a voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); See also Criminal LawGrandJuries, Exemplars and Prosecutors, Note, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 737 (1973).
73. People v. Polk, 21 ll.2d 594, 174 N.E.2d 393 (1961).
74. People v. Rockola, 346 Ill. 27, 178 N.E. 384 (1931); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 106-1
(1977); Many of the difficult questions concerning prosecutorial discretion in the use of the
grand jury arise out of the function allowed in federal grand juries called "use immunity". See
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Because the Illinois statute grants only "transactional immunity" and not "us6 immunity," the prosecutorial discretion in the investigatory function of the grand jury is substantially less than that of federal grand juries. The lessening of the
power reduces discretion and the potential for abuse. See People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald, 66
11.2d 546, 363 N.E.2d 835 (1977).
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tion. Very little of that discretion is subject to review. However, the
ultimate review of such discretion occurs when the issues are brought
to trial, but the possible remedy is only partially effective. A verdict
of not guilty granted to a defendant who had been charged through
prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury is perhaps a vindication of the
system of criminal justice, but not of the prosecutorial abuse.
In our hypothetical situations, it is evident that various standards
provide the prosecutor little guidance in determining the appropriate
use of the grand jury. For instance, in the case of the young rape
victim, should you point out in your "legal advisor" capacity that your
experience leads you to believe that with only a "one on one" identification by a white female of a black male, coupled with a two
month delay in "outcry" and no corroboration, there is little chance of
a conviction. Is this "evidence which tends to negate guilt" or lack of
evidence which would show guilt? Should you "advise" the grand
jury? If yes, what would your advice be?
In the child dismemberment killing, assume that no motion to suppress the confession had been filed. If the preliminary hearing results
in a finding of probable cause without the use of the confession, the
decision would have to be made whether to present the case to the
grand jury in an effort to screen out this case with a "no bill of indictment." If "no probable cause" had been found at the preliminary
hearing, should the grand jury be presented with either the unsuppressed confession or the defendant's conviction as "evidence" to sustain a true bill of indictment in an effort to overrrule the preliminary
hearing court judge? The defendant, you might rationalize, could take
the stand and make the conviction admissible. The confession hasn't
been suppressed. Even if it was suppressed, you may be able to use
it for impeachment purposes if the defendant takes the stand at trial.
In the police shooting example, assume that a finding of "no probable cause" was rendered on the charge of involuntary manslaughter at
the preliminary hearing. Should you seek an indictment if you believe the shooting was not "justified"? If so, how would you explain
the amount of force a police officer is allowed under statute to use
when confronted with a fleeing forcible felon? Should you inform the
grand jury of the preliminary hearing court's finding of no probable
cause? Does case law or ethical standards give specific answers to the
use of these broad powers?
Considering that the prosecutor controls the exercise and option to
use these rather broad powers of the grand jury, he should be circumspect and cautious in their application. Good faith use of the
powers must be maintained so that the citizens he is protecting are
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not harassed by vexacious charges. 75 Additionally, he must insure
that the secrecy of the proceedings 76 is scrupulously observed.
The American Bar Association Standards 7 7 perceive the role of the
prosecutor as a legal adviser to the grand jury. In reference to the
quality and scope of evidence at the grand jury proceedings, the
A.B.A. Standards 78 suggest that the prosecutor present only evidence
which he believes would be admissible at trial. However, the standards go on to recognize that in "appropriate cases," summarizing the
admissible evidence is proper. Evidence known to the prosecutor
which would negate guilt, under these standards, should be disclosed
79
to the grand jury.
In reference to the practice of the subpoena and immunity powers,
the American Bar Association Standards encourage the prosecutorial
practice of informing potential defendants called before the grand jury
that they may be charged and therefore "should seek legal counsel." 80 Provisions of the Illinois statute provide for this practice as a
matter of legislative direction. 8 1 The National Prosecution Stan75. People v. Sears, 49 1Il.2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-16 (1975).
77. A.B.A. STANDARDS, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3.5. This Standard provides:
(A) Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as legal advisor to the grand jury he
may appropriately explain the law and express his opinion on the legal significance
of the evidence but he should give due deference to its status as an independent
legal body.
(B) The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury in a manner which would be impermissible at trial before a petit

jury.
(C) The prosecutor's communications and presentations to the grand jury should be
on the record.
78. Id. at Standard 3.6.
79. Id. An expansive treatment of this issue can be found in Note, Criminal Procedure-District Attorney is Under an Implied Statutory Duty to Inform Grand Jury of Exculpatory Evidence.
Johnson v. Superior Court, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 648 (1976).
80. Id. at Standard 3.6.
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-14(b) (1975). Compare NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 14.3 with A.B.A. STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3.6(d).
Standard 14.3 provides:
(A) The precise scope of grand jury investigatory functions should be determined by
each state.
(B) Witnesses before grand jury investigating panels should be allowed the assistance of counsel, unless and until immunity is granted. Counsel should not accompany the witness into the grand jury room during the testimony, but should only be
available for consultation outside the grand jury room.
(C) State law should provide that upon petition from two or more prosecutors, a
grand jury be impaneled to investigate matters of a special nature, and to bring
charges based upon that investigation based on activities within all the counties
joining the petition.
(D) Where grand jury reporting is provided for, the reporting function should be
governed by the following procedures:
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dards echo the A.B.A. Standards on all the above-mentioned provisions except for the provision on legal advice. The National Standards
merely "allow" for informing potential defendants that they should
1. The grand jury may submit to the court by which it was impaneled a report:
(a) Concerning misconduct, nonfeasance or neglect in public office by a public
servant as the basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action; or
(b) Stating that after investigation of a public servant it finds no misconduct,
nonfeasance or neglect in office by that individual provided that such public
servant has requested the submission of such report; or
(c) Proposing recommendation for legislative, executive or administrative action
in the public interest based upon stated findings.
2. The court to which such report is submitted shall examine it and the minutes
of the grand jury and, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (4) four, shall
make an order accepting and filing such report as a public record only if the court
is satisfied that it complies with the provisions of subdivision (1) one and that:
(a) The report is based upon facts revealed in the course of an investigation and
is supported by the preponderance of the credible and legally admissible evidence; and
(b) When the report is submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision (1)
one, that each person named therein was afforded an opportunity to testify
before the grand jury prior to the filing of such report, and when the report is
submitted pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c) of subdivision (1) one, it is not critical of an identified or identifiable person.
3. The order accepting a report pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision (1) one,
and the report itself, must be sealed by the court and may not be filed as a public
record, or be subject to subpoena or otherwise be made public until at least
thirty-one days after a copy of the order and the report are served upon each
public servant named therein, until the afflrmance of the order accepting the
report, or until reversal of the order sealing the report, or until dismissal of the
appeal of the named public servant by the appellate division, whichever occurs
later. Such public servant may file with the clerk of the court an answer to such
report, not later than twenty days after service of the order and report. Such an
answer shall plainly and concisely state the facts and law constituting the defense
of the public servant to the charges in said report, and except for those parts of
the answer which the court may determine to be scandalously or prejudicially and
unnecessarily inserted therein, shall become an appendix to the report. Upon the
expiration of the time set forth in this subdivision, the prosecuting attorney shall
deliver a true copy of such report, and the appendix if any, for appropriate action, to each public servant or body having removal or disciplinary authority over
each public servant named therein. The determination by the court as to whether
a report is in compliance with the requirement of this standard, and should be
filed as a public record, or whether it should remain sealed for any reason, including prejudice to an on-going criminal matter, should be subject to appellate
review.
4. Upon the submission of a report pursuant to subdivision (1) one, if the court
finds that the filing of such report as a public record, may prejudice fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, it must order such report sealed and such
report may not be subject to subpoena or public inspection during the pendency
of such criminal matter, except upon order of the court.
5. Whenever the court to which a report is submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of
subdivision (1) one is not satisfied that the report complies with the provisions of
subdivision (2) two, it may direct that additional testimony be taken before the
same grand jury, or it must make an order sealing such report, and the report

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:625

seek legal advice and do not state an affirmative duty of the pros82
ecutor to do so.
The Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti 83 reaffirmed approval of total hearsay indictments. 84 More importantly, it
defined the limitations on judicial inquiry as to prosecutorial action in
the grand jury. 8 5 Quoting from Costello v. United States,8 6 the
Romiti court rejected the contention that an indictment is open to
challenge because only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand
jury or that indictments were open to challenge on the grounds of
inadequacy or incompetency of evidence. The court held that a
87
hearing to determine this issue is not authorized by statute.
The decision in People ex rel. Sears serves to re-emphasize the
need for a high self-imposed ethical standard if the prosecutor is to
faithfully execute the charge of representing all the people. The
largely unfettered and unreviewable discretion to use the grand jury
places a heavy moral burden on the user of that power. The prosecutor's dual role as advocate and as administrator and seeker of justice must be delicately balanced. Only through judicious use of grand
jury discretion can a prosecutor build community confidence in this
citizen-participative function of the justice system.
THE GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCING:

THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE

As axiomatic as it may sound, it must be stated that the prosecutor
does not plead defendants guilty. Further, he does not sentence defendants. The prerogative of pleading guilty to a crime is one which is
the defendant's choice-not a choice of the court or the prosecutor.

may not be filed as public record, or be subject to subpoena or otherwise be
made public.
A.B.A. STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3.6 provides:

(E) The prosecutor should not compel the appearance of a witness before the grand
jury whose activities are the subject of the inquiry if the witness states in advance
that if called he will exercise his constitutional privilege not to testify, unless the
prosecutor intends to seek a grant of immunity according to the law.
82. See note 81 supra.
83. People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill.2d 51, 277 N.E.2d 705 (1971).
84. As decided in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); see also People v.
Peacock, 20 I11. App.3d 969, 313 N.E.2d 470 (1974); People v. Sawyer, 42 Ill.2d 294, 251
N.E.2d 230 (1969).
85. 50 Il.2d at 59-61, 277 N.E.2d at 709-10.
86. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
87. 50 Ill.2d at 55; 277 N.E.2d at 707.
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Sentencing for the crime pleaded to is a prerogative of the court.8 8
However, this is not to say that the prosecutor does not play an important role in the plea of guilty.
As a representative of the People, the prosecutor confers with the
defense when the defendant desires to plead guilty, 89 and sometimes
reaches an agreement as to what a "proper" sentence should be. This
agreement, when presented to the court, is no more than a recommendation and is not binding on the court. 90 Further, the prosecutor, as a part of the plea process, may reduce the charge
pending to a less serious charge, dismiss certain counts and charges,
agree not to commence other charges against the defendant, 9 1 or any
combination of the above. This power results from the prosecutor's
function as the officer responsible for all indictments and prosecutions
in which the People of the State or county have an interest. 92 How88. People v. Congleton, 16 I11.App.3d 1003, 308 N.E.2d 156 (1974); People v. Kadlecek,
391 I11. 470, 63 N.E.2d 497 (1945).
89. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 402.
90. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978). This recent decision reaffirms the decisions of Blackledge v. Allison, 430 U.S. 63 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The
Court distinguished the facts in Bordenkircher from the "vindictive" abuse of prosecutorial
discretion found in Chaffin v. Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) or in North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969). The Court in Bordenkircher found that "in the 'give-and-take' of plea
bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free
to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." 98 S. Ct. at 668. See also ILL. REV. STAT. cli. 38, §
1005-4-4 (Supp. 1977); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, The Prosecution Function, Standard 16.1. This Standard provides:
A. Where it appears that the interest of the state in the effective administration
of criminal justice will be served, the prosecutor, while under no obligation to
negotiate any criminal charges, may engage in plea negotiations for the purpose of
reaching an appropriate plea agreement. This should be done only through defense
counsel, except when the accused is not eligible for or does not desire appointment
of counsel and has not retained counsel.
B. The prosecutor, in reaching a plea agreement, may agree to one or more of
the following dispositions, depending on the circumstances of the case:
1. To make or not. oppose favorable recommendations concerning the sentence
which may be imposed if the accused enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; or
2. To seek or not to oppose dismissal of the offense charged if the accused
enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to another offense reasonably related to
the accused's conduct; or
3. To seek or not oppose dismissal of other charges or potential charges against
the accused if the accused enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
C. Similarly situated defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement opportunities.
91. People v. Lambrechts, 41 Ill. App.3d 729, 355 N.E.2d 53 (1976); People v. Weeks, 37
Ill. App.3d 41, 344 N.E.2d 791 (1976); People v. Moats, 16 Il. App.3d 840, 307 N.E.2d 156
(1974).
92. People v. Pohl, 47 Ill. App.2d 232, 197 N.E.2d 759 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5
(1) (1975).
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ever, any agreement reached between the prosecutor and the defense
can never reach fruition unless it receives the approval of the court,
since it is the court, not the prosecutor, which must sentence. 93
The prosecutor's role must be put in the proper perspective. Some
critics of plea bargaining, or pleading guilty generally, seem to have
an abiding conviction that the guilty plea process or the prosecutor's
discretion in the area is the genesis of all defendants' problems and
perhaps all the problems in the criminal justice system. 94 One pervading criticism is that prosecutors, through the use of their discretion, often penalize defendants who choose to refuse the agreements
tendered by the prosecutor. The claim is that the defendant who refuses and is subsequently convicted, is sentenced to a term longer
than that contemplated at the plea discussion. The prosecutor recommends a further penalty after a trial and the judge often gives it.
Therefore, it appears that the defendant is penalized for exercising his
right to trial. 95 It must be remembered, however, that it is the court

93. The plea agreement and recommendation will be considered, for the purposes of this
paper, as including all the options listed in the material and cases in notes 30 to 35 supra.
94. One commentator charged (before finishing the first paragraph of his article and without
citation or authority) that of all executive and judicial discretion "none is potentially more
dangerous than that of the public prosecutor." Comment, ProsecutorialDiscretion-A ReEvaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretion and Its Potentialfor Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L.
REv. 485, 485 (1971). The comment went on to say (again in the opening paragraph and again
with citation to no authority) that the inherent potential for abuse by the prosecutor's office
"... ominously threatens the adversary system of justice." Id. at 485. According to this commentator,' the area of plea bargaining best exemplifies the prosecutor's potentially abusive discretion.
95. See NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,

COURTS ch. 3 (1973); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179 (1975); Hartman, Plea Bargaining:The Defense Perspective, 6 POLICE L.Q. 16 (1977). See
Kavanaugh, Plea Bargaining:The Prosecutor'sPerspective, 6 POLICE L.Q. 5 (1977) for a discussion of this point.
The now retired Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, Walter V. Schaefer, made a statement
which was actually a precursor of that which was to become the law of the land:
These cases illustrate some of the problems that may result from a 'negotiated'
plea-a plea of guilty to a lesser offense entered by agreement with the prosecution, for example, or one entered after an understanding has been reached as to the
sentence that the prosecution will recommend. These and other problems could be
eliminated by a rule that would prohibit any differentiation between a sentence
imposed after a plea of guilty and one imposed after trial. Such a rule, however,
would invite speculation without risk upon the mischances of a trial. As stated by
Professor A.R.N. Cross, 'If a plea of guilty were not, at least on occasions, to affect
sentence, it is difficult to see why the professional criminal should ever plead
guilty.' See CROSS, PARADOXES IN PRISON SENTENCES (1965). Moreover,

such a

rule would require a sentencing judge to ignore in every case the defendant's
knowledge of his own guilt, however clearly that knowledge might have been established, and to disregard the assumed psychological effect on an acknowledgement
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that sentences. A mere showing that the sentence recommended by
the prosecutor and imposed by the court is greater than the one rejected during plea negotiations does not amount to a demonstration of
prosecutorial abuse.
Fairness, albeit a nebulous quality, should be a goal sought by the
prosecutor in his relations with the defendant at all stages in the

of guilt as an important step in the process of reformation. In the present state of
our knowledge of human psychology it is at least doubtful that judges should be
required, in every case, to disregard that assumption when imposing sentence.
People v. Darrah, 33 Ill.2d 175, 180, 210 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1965).
Subsequent challenges to the process of granting a "benefit of the bargain" to the
defendant who admitted his guilt by plea of guilty eventually reached the United
States Supreme Court. The Constitutional challenge was that his Fifth Amendment
right had been violated by the pressure of the lenient sentence for a plea as opposed to the greater sentence which might result after a trial. Justice White,
speaking for the majority in reference to this challenge, stated:
Brady's claim is of a different sort: that it violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or promise of leniency and that a
guilty plea is coerced and invalid if influenced by the fear of a possibly higher
penalty for the crime charged if a conviction is obtained after the State is put to
its proof.
Insofar as the voluntariness of his plea is concerned, there is little to differentiate Brady from (1) the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge and jury
have the same range of sentencing power, who pleads guilty because his lawyer
advised him that the judge will very probably be more lenient than the jury; (2)
the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge alone has sentencing power, who
is advised by counsel that the judge is normally more lenient with defendants
who plead guilty than with those who go to trial; (3) the defendant who is permitted by .prosecutor and judge to plead guilty to a lesser offense included in the
offense charged; and (4) the defendant who pleads guilty to certain counts with
the understanding that other charges will be dropped. In each of these situations,
as in Brady's case, the defendant might never plead guilty absent the possibility
or certainty that the plea will result in a lesser penalty than the sentence that
could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty. We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment
whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending
from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime
charged . . . But we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend
a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and
who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success
in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Government to forbid
guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single invariable penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to place the sentencing function in a separate authority
who has no knowledge of the manner in which the conviction in each case was
obtained. In any event, it would be necessary to forbid prosecutors and judges to
accept guilty pleas to selected counts, to lesser ,included offenses, or to reduce
charges. The Fifth Amendment does not reach so far.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51, 753 (1970).
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criminal process. His sentencing recommendations should be rendered with fairness and justice. The conversion of these abstruse
goals into concrete action is the prosecutor's greatest difficulty. While
the National Prosecutor Standards exhort the prosecutor to zealously
guard the rights of individual defendants, 96 he must nevertheless
place the rights of society in a paramount position. The National
Standards suggest 35 specific criteria for use as guidelines by the
prosecutor but provide little practical assistance in assigning weights
to all of these factors and their infinite number of combinations. It is
impossible to arrive at an objectively "correct" and consistent system
for sentencing recommendations.
Because the prosecutor is both administrator of justice and advocate, he has a duty to seek justice, not merely to convict. 97 Severity
of sentence is not to be the prosecutor's index of effectiveness. 98 It is

Standard 1.3(d) provides:
The prosecutor should consider all available models of control of human behavior
from the standpoint of the ultimate benefit to society. The prosecutor should at all
times be zealous in the desire to protect the rights of individuals, but must place
the rights of society in a paramount position in exercising prosecutorial discretion in
individual cases and in the approach to the larger issues of improving the law and
making the law conform to the needs of society.

96. NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STANDARDS,

97. A.B.A. STANDARDS,

THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION,

Standard 1.1. This Standard pro-

vides:
(A) The office of prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement official of his jurisdiction,
is an agency of the executive branch of government, which is charged with the duty
to see that the laws are faithfully executed and enforced in order to maintain the
rule of law.
(B) The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an advocate; he must
exercise sound discretion in the performance of his functions.
(C) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
(D) It is the duty of the prosecutor to know and be guided by the standards of
professional conduct as defined in codes and canons of the legal profession, and in
this report. The prosecutor should make use of the guidance afforded by an advisory
council of the kind described in ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Section
1.3.
(E) In this report the term "unprofessional conduct" denotes conduct which is or
should be made subject to disciplinary sanctions. Where other terms are used, the
standard is intended as a guide to honorable professional conduct and performance.
These Standards are not intended as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged
misconduct of the prosecutor to determine the validity of a conviction; they may or
may not be relevant in such judicial evaluation, depending upon all the circumstances.
98. Id. at Standard 6.1. This Standard provides:
(A) The prosecutor should not make the severity of sentences the index of his effectiveness. To the extent that he becomes involved in the sentencing process, he
should seek to assure that a fair and informed judgment is made on the sentence
and to avoid unfair sentence disparities.

1978]

PROSECUTORIAL POWERS

not ordinarily within the province of the prosecutor to make any
specific recommendation as to sentencing. 9" Therefore, if a prosecutor refrains from making sentence recommendations, it would be
difficult to charge him with vindictiveness for recommending a
harsher sentence than the one rejected by the defendant during pretrial negotiations.
If the prosecutor's office is going to make recommendations as to
sentencing after trial, it would be appropriate to stress at the plea
negotiations that the prosecutor's plea recommendation is one made
in contemplation of giving the defendant the "benefit of the bargain."
The prosecutor might, for example, state at the plea conference what
he believes is an appropriate sentence. However, he would explain
that were the defendant to plead guilty he would recommend a
shorter period of time. If negotiations proved fruitless and defendant
went to trial and was convicted, a recommendation of the original
sentence would on its face demonstrate a lack of vindictiveness. This
approach does not offer protection from the vindictive prosecutor who
could still inflate what he believed to-be an appropriate sentence
during plea negotiations. The safeguard against this practice is of
course the sentencing court which acts independently of the prosecutor in rendering fair and impartial sentences. 10 0
According to one survey, 1' 1 approximately 75% of the prosecutors
polled participate to some extent in the sentence recommendation
process. Thus, the potential for vindictive post-trial sentence recommendations is clear and the prosecutor who does recommend must
zealously guard against this tendency. The prosecutor who achieves
objectivity, and has developed a reputation for that objectivity, can
play a valuable role in offsetting defense counsel's recommendations
by representing the victim's and society's point of view at sen02
tencing. 1
(B) Where sentence is fixed by the judge without jury participation, the prosecutor
ordinarily should not make any specific recommendation as to the appropriate sentence, unless his recommendation is requested by the court or he has agreed to
make a recommendation as the result of plea discussions.
(C) Where sentence is fixed by the jury, the prosecutor should present evidence on
the issue within the limits permitted in the jurisdiction, but he should avoid introducing evidence bearing on sentence which will prejudice the jury's determination
of the issue of guilt.
99. Id. at Standard 6.1 (B).
100. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L: REv. 50, 104 (1968).
101. Teitelbaum, The Prosecutor'sRole in the Sentencing Process:A National Survey, 1 AM.
J. CusM. L. 75 (1972).
102. It is the author's personal position and the Cook County Prosecutor's Office policy that
during plea negotiation the prosecutor should state his assessment of a proper sentence for the
crime and his reduced recommendation in return for a guilty plea. After a trial on the merits, the
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One discernible area of abuse which has been criticized by reviewing courts is the practice of not following through on the prosecutorial promise made in plea negotiation. The Supreme Court has
commented that the plea negotiation process "Im]ust be attended by
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." 103 The
principle of the "unfulfilled" promise is followed by Illinois
courts. 10 4 This same principle of fulfillment of plea agreements is
inherent, though not explicitly stated, in the National Prosecution
Standards 105 and the American Bar Association Standards. 10 6

prosecutor contributes all the aggravation factors of which he is aware and the factors which are
required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 73 (1963). But he does not make specific sentence
recommendations. He may, however, make general recommendations such as statements in
opposition to probationary release or in favor of long incarceration. The exceptions to the rule
are made when there is a judicial request for specific recommendations or high supervisory
approval is given to recommend sentences in particularly egregious crimes. In capital cases the
prosecutor may request a death sentence hearing in accordance with statute. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 9-1 (d) (1975).
103. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
104. People v. Pier, 51 Ill.2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1976); People v. Mahood, 59 Ill.2d 106,
319 N.E.2d 486 (1974); People v. Smith, 28 I11.
App.3d 908, 329 N.E.2d 896 (1975).

105.

NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,

Standard 16.4. This Standard provides:

(A) A prosecutor should not make any promise concerning the sentence which
will be imposed or concerning a suspension of sentence; the prosecutor may properly advise the accused of the position he will take concerning disposition.
(B) A prosecutor should avoid implying a greater power to influence the disposition of a case than prosecution actually posesses.
(C) If the prosecutor is unable to fulfill an understanding previously agreed upon in
plea negotiations, the prosecutor should give notice promptly to the accused and
cooperate in securing leave of the court for the accused to withdraw any plea and take
other steps as would be appropriate to restore the accused and the state to the position they were in before the understanding was reached or plea made.

106. A.B.A.

STANDARDS,

THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION,

Standard 4.3. This Standard pro-

vides:
(A) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to make any promise or commitment concerning the sentence which will be imposed or concerning a suspension of
sentence; he may properly advise the defense what position he will take concerning
disposition.
(B) A prosecutor should avoid implying a greater power to influence the disposition
of a case than he possesses.
(C) If the prosecutor finds he is unable to fulfill an understanding previously agreed
upon in plea discussions, he should give notice promptly to the defendant and
cooperate in securing leave of the court for the defendant to withdraw any plea and
take other steps appropriate to restore the defendant to the position he was in
before the understanding was reached or plea made.
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Returning once again to the fact situations, 10 7 assume that in each
case an affirmative charging decision has been made. Further assume
that you, the prosecutor, are engaged in a defense requested plea
negotiation.
In the case of the 16 year old rape victim the defense attorney tells
you, "My guy will take one year flat for a reduction to aggravated
battery." You have developed some personal doubts as to whether or
not the defendant committed the -crime. You are aware that a jury is
not likely to convict this defendant, and that the judge who is to try
this case would consider the evidence not only insufficient but almost
humorous. You do not know whether the defense is aware of the trial
judge's attitude. The 26 year old defendant's record indicates multiple
arrests and one misdemeanor conviction reduced from indecent liberties to contributing to sexual delinquency. Joining the women's action
group in the courtroom is a Time magazine correspondent who is
following the case. The rape victim believes that emasculation or a
death sentence is the appropriate penalty for this defendant. Should
you agree to reduce and recommend one year on a plea to aggravated
battery in this case when you feel rather certain that your evidence
will fail? Rephrased, is it ethical to go to trial or to agree to a plea
where you have personal doubts about the defendant's guilt?
While pondering this case you are called to the phone. The
spokesman for the 14 lawyers who variously represent the 200 "Las
Vegas Night" arrestees informs you that Judge Farwright will not accept pleas for a disposition of supervision unless your office so recommends. The spokesman further informs you that the parishioners
are agreed to the disposition, except that they will request a jury trial
and fully exercise their voir dire rights-600 peremptory challenges-unless the pastor and curate are nolle prossed.. There are
hundreds of cases on the court call for more serious charges than the
gambling case. The Black and Latino media have equated the "parish
gambling" to the "numbers" and "bolita" gambling that takes place in
their communities. Their attitude is that, "if you prosecute one
group, you must prosecute the other." The judge, the lawyers, the
priests, the parishioners, the Blacks, the Latinos and the Archbishop
of the diocese all await your exercise of discretion.
The case law and the various standards do not provide "answers" to
these situations. As with charging and grand jury discretion, the case

107. The various situations described are not the paraphernalia of an active imagination. Each
of the fact situations set forth has been changed slightly in non-substantial part from actual
occurrences, but they have happened in Cook County, Illinois.
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law and ethical provisions are not intended to give answers but only
direction. The goal is to achieve a balance between the role of advocate and that of seeker of justice.l 0 8 The guidelines provided by case
law, and the various standards should be widely disseminated.
Hopefully publication of these comments will also, in some measure,
help to achieve this goal.
CONCLUSION

To the extent that the prosecutor exercises discretion in charging,
in grand jury use or in sentencing, he must balance different and
often times divergent interests. He must consider the effect of what
he does not only on the defendant, but on potential defendants; not
only on the victim, but on potential victims; and, indeed, on the
system of justice and society as a whole. The prosecutor should resist
succumbing to political pressures, personal ambition, peer pressures,
a desire to be liked by the court or the defense bar or the public,
competitiveness, fear of defeat at trial, vindictiveness, sentimentality,
or leniency, whenever these influences would upset a proper balance in the exercise of his vast discretionary powers.

108. In Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921), the court's opinion
spoke succinctly concerning the prosecutor's power and its use:
The powers of a district attorney under our laws are very extensive. They affect
to a high degree the liberty of the individual, the good order of society, and the
safety of the community . . . . Powers so great impose responsibilities correspondingly grave. They demand character incorruptible, reputation unsullied, a high
standard of professional ethics and sound judgment of no mean order . . . . A district attorney cannot treat that office as his selfish affair. It is a public trust. The
office is not a private property, but is to be held and administered wholly in the
interests of the people at large and with an eye single to their welfare.
Id. at 489, 132 N.E. at 326.

